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I Priority No. 15 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants G. Richard 
Kasteler and Mary L. Daines, (hereinafter "Appellants"), by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record John Martinez, hereby submit the following Opening Brief: 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are identified in the caption herein. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER THIS CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0)(1996) and Utah R. App. P. Rule 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellants failed to state claims for 
relief for wrongful liens which were not "expressly authorized by ... state ... statute" as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a)? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. No deference to trial court. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court also erroneously conclude that Appellants failed to state claims 
for relief for wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) on the ground that 
Appellees' recording of lis pendens against Appellants' homes was protected by the judicial 
proceedings privilege? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. No deference to trial court. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
3. Did the trial court further err in dismissing Appellants' remaining claims for slander 
of title, quiet title, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on the 
1 
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court's dismissal of Appellants' claims for wrongful liens? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. No deference to trial court. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter. 838 
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6): 
"Wrongful Lien' means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state: or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2: 
"In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter ... may file for 
record ... a notice of the pendency of the action .... From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the 
action... ." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b): 
"The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a counter bond in 
the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond 
executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are not parties 
to the action. The form of the bond is at the defendant's option. The bond shall be 
payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file the bond prior to the 
expiration of three days from the date he is served with notice of the filing of 
plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the 
probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff 
2 
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if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid 
rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-4: 
"(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real 
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately 
caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address 
of the lien claimant, the person is liable to the record interest holder for $1,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. 
"(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 
38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or 
having reason to know the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4): 
"If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent,, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the 
judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately." 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants seek relief from Appellees for the wrongful and illegal recording by 
Appellees of "lis pendens" on Appellants' homes, which had the effect of impairing and 
clouding title to such homes. (R. 3-4, fflf 9-10) This appeal is from the final order and 
judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants' complaint in its entirety with prejudice 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 283, fflf 1-3) 
On July 15, 1998, Defendant-Appellee Parkside Salt Lake Corporation as landlord 
brought an Unlawful Detainer Action against tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. to recover possession 
of commercial office space located at 215 South State Street in Salt Lake City. (R. 94, fflf 7, 
8) 
On August 13, 1998, Insure-Rite, Inc., the tenant in the Unlawful Detainer Action, 
filed a "Renter's Counter Bond" in the form of a property bond, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-36-8.5(2)(b), in order to stay on the premises until the conclusion of the Unlawful 
Detainer Action. (R. 188-194) Plaintiffs-Appellants herein, Mr. G. Richard Kasteler and Ms. 
Mary L. Daines, two people who, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), were 
not parties to the Unlawful Detainer Action, executed the Renter's Counter Bond, whereby 
Ms. Daines and Mr. Kasteler became sureties to the tenant with respect to payment of 
damages and costs, up to a maximum of $25,000, in the event that the tenant were ultimately 
found in unlawful detainer and did not pay such damages and costs, and further pledged their 
4 
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homes as additional security for such payment. (R. 188-189) 
On November 30, 1998, the trial court signed a written ORDER granting Landlord 
Parkside?s motion for partial summary judgment seeking possession. (R. 110-112) On 
December 6, 1998, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. finished vacating the lease premises. 
On March 26, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER granting Landlord 
Parkside's motion for partial summary judgment regarding damages, and trebled the amount 
to $108,417.24. (R. 115-116) 
On or about March 30, 1999, Appellees Greggory J. Savage and Matthew N. Evans, 
in their capacities as attorneys at Appellee Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP, and on behalf of 
such law firm in its representation of landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, recorded in 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office a lis pendens on the home of Plaintiff Mary L. 
Daines, (R. 196-199) and a second lis pendens on the home of Plaintiff G. Richard Kasteler. 
(R. 201-204) Neither when such lis pendens were recorded, nor at any time thereafter, was 
any lawsuit filed by Appellees against Appellants Mr. Kasteler or Ms. Daines, nor against 
their homes. (R. 4,1f 11) 
On June 4, 1999, landlord-Appellant acknowledged receipt of the tenant's payment 
of the $108,417.24 judgment. Accordingly, on August 17, 1999, Appellants by letter from 
their counsel demanded that Appellees remove both lis pendens. (R. 206) On August 20, 
1999, Appellees through a letter by Appellee Greggory J. Savage refused to remove the two 
5 
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lis pendens, stating, "If you disagree with this position, please let me know and we will 
address this matter to the Court." (R. 221) Anticipating such response, on August 18, 1999, 
Appellants served Appellees with a Complaint alleging causes of action arising from the 
recording of the two lis pendens by Appellees. (R. 208-220) On or about September 1, 1999, 
Appellees sent Appellants' counsel, Nick J. Colessides, copies of what purported to be 
Releases of each of the lis pendens. (R. 223-230) Insure-Rite, Inc., the tenant in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action, paid all damages, costs, and fees on a timely basis to Appellant Parkside 
Salt Lake Corporation, the landlord-plaintiff in such action. (R. 118) 
By Memorandum Decision dated January 19, 2000, (R. 274-281) and Final Judgment 
entered on February 7, 2000, (R. 289-291) the trial court dismissed Appellants' complaint 
in its entirety for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
6 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is about whether a landlord may use the formidable weapon of recording 
lis pendens against the homes of a tenant's bond sureties without first filing an independent 
action against the sureties on their bond as required by Utah statutes and case law. 
Landlord-tenant law, surety law and lien law are all involved in this case. First, 
Appellee-landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation brought an unlawful detainer action to 
evict Insure-Rite, Inc., a commercial tenant, from certain office space in downtown Salt Lake 
City. Second, in order to stay on the premises while the eviction proceedings were pending, 
the tenant filed a "property bond" as provided by the Unlawful Detainer statute. Under the 
property bond, Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines, Appellants herein, (who, as required by the 
Unlawful Detainer statute, were not parties to the unlawful detainer proceeding), became 
sureties to the tenant with respect to payment of damages and costs in the event the tenant 
were ultimately found to be in unlawful detainer and did not pay such damages and costs. 
Under the bond, Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines pledged their homes as additional security. 
Third, this case also involves the lien area of law because immediately after the trial 
court ruled that the commercial tenant had been in unlawful detainer and assessed damages 
therefor, the landlord, without filing an independent action on Appellants-sureties' bond as 
required by law, recorded two lis pendens against the homes of Appellants Mr. Kasteler and 
Ms. Daines, thereby clouding the title to their homes. (In fact, the tenant promptly moved out 
7 
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and paid all damages, so the landlord had no reason for taking any action against Appellants-
sureties or against their homes.) 
A lis pendens is the most insidious type of lien: It is a document stating that there is 
a lawsuit pending affecting title to the land upon which it is recorded; it subordinates the 
interests of all persons who take title or liens with respect to the land subsequent to the date 
of the recordation of the lis pendens to the interests of those who acquire rights in the land 
as a result of the outcome of the pending lawsuit; and it imparts merely constructive notice 
of that subordination. Since no prospective purchaser or lender will "buy a pig in a poke" by 
acquiring an interest that will be subordinated to the rights arising from the undetermined 
outcome of the pending litigation, the practical effect of a recorded lis pendens is to render 
land unmarketable and unsuitable as security for a loan. Because of those dire consequences, 
Utah's lis pendens statute expressly provides that there must be a pending "action affecting 
title to or possession" of the realty upon which a lis pendens is filed. Moreover, because the 
lis pendens in this case was filed against Appellants as bond sureties, the Utah common law 
rule that claims on bonds may only be enforced by an independent action against the sureties 
doubly required the landlord to file an independent action before recording the lis pendens 
herein. Instead, the landlord grossly exceeded its rights and engaged in a form of "self-help" 
in order to oppress and harass the tenant and its sureties by recording the lis pendens on the 
Appellants-sureties1 homes without first bringing an independent enforcement action against 
8 
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Appellants-sureties on their bond. 
Appellants Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines alleged in their complaint that the landlord's 
recording of such lis pendens were "wrongful liens" because they were not "expressly 
authorized by... state ... statute" as required by Section 38-9-l(6)(a) of Utah's Wrongful Lien 
Statute. Appellants further alleged that such filing also gave rise to additional claims for 
slander of title, quiet title and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
trial court erroneously concluded, however, that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, the lis pendens 
statute, when read in conjunction with the Unlawful Detainer Statute, authorized such lis 
pendens, even though such authority was not "expressly" provided in either statute. The trial 
court further erroneously concluded that such lis pendens were lawful under the alternative 
theory that they were protected by the common law "judicial proceedings" privilege. 
Appellants contend in this appeal that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, authorizing lis 
pendens for pending actions "affecting title to or the right to possession" of real estate, did 
not "expressly" authorize the lis pendens recorded by Appellees as required by § 38-9-l(6)(a) 
of the Wrongful Lien Statute. The only action pending when the lis pendens were recorded 
against Appellants' homes was the unlawful detainer proceeding against a commercial tenant 
with respect to commercial real estate. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 contains no express 
provision that lis pendens may be filed against renter's bond sureties as occurred here, nor 
does Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 expressly provide that unlawful detainer proceedings are 
9 
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actions "affecting title to or the right to possession" of the realty of renter's bond sureties as 
involved here. 
Finding no express provision authorizing the lis pendens, and contrary to the 
requirement in § 38-9-l(6)(a) that such authority must be express, the trial court erroneously 
implied such authority from two provisions in the Unlawful Detainer Statute in order to reach 
its conclusion that the unlawful detainer proceeding was an "action affecting title to or the 
right to possession" of Appellants' homes under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. First, the trial 
court held that Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), stating that a renter's counter bond "shall 
be payable to the clerk of the court," authorized the lis pendens herein. Appellants contend 
that this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of such provision, since the terms do 
not expressly nor implicitly provide that a landlord may record a lis pendens against sureties' 
realty, with or without filing an independent action. In stark contrast, numerous provisions 
in other statutes and rules dispensing with the common law requirement that bonds must be 
enforced by independent actions, expressly provide that "The surety's liability may be 
enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action." More fundamentally, 
the trial court's interpretation is contrary to the well-established axiom in Utah landlord-
tenant law that the unlawful detainer statute must be strictly construed against the landlord. 
Second, the trial court also held that Utah Code Ann.§ 78-36-10(4), stating with 
respect to unlawful detainer that "In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
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immediately," authorized the lis pendens herein. Appellants contend that this interpretation 
also is contrary to the plain language of the statute, since again the language says nothing 
about whether an independent action must be brought on sureties1 bonds, in contrast to 
numerous other Utah provisions expressly dispensing with such requirement in no uncertain 
terms. Further, the trial court's interpretation would similarly contradict the axiom that the 
Utah Unlawful Detainer statute must be strictly construed against landlords. 
The trial court's alternative ground for decision, that the lis pendens herein were 
shielded by the common law judicial proceedings privilege, was similarly erroneous. The 
judicial proceedings privilege is intended to protect statements by parties or counsel 
concerning ongoing litigation. Lis pendens, however, are not mere expressions, but 
encumbrances on title. By recording the lis pendens herein, the landlord was not merely 
expressing views about judicial proceedings, but instead utilized the lis pendens as additional 
leverage in the form of self-help, to pressure the tenant into moving out and into quickly 
paying the unlawful detainer judgment. The Utah lis pendens statute is a legislative 
recognition of the potent effect of recording lis pendens and therefore imposes the 
requirement that there must be an action pending "affecting title to or the right to possession" 
of the realty upon which lis pendens are recorded. The trial court turned the limitation on its 
head by construing the unlawful detainer proceeding involving unrelated commercial real 
estate as authorization for the lis pendens. In doing so, the trial court read the limitation out 
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of the lis pendens statute, and simultaneously handed landlords a self-help weapon which the 
Legislature has withheld. 
Current law gives Appellee-landlord appropriate and fair relief: If the tenant had not 
timely paid (as indeed it did), the landlord should have sought payment from Mr. Kasteler 
and Ms. Daines personally on their bond obligation, and if they also had not paid as set out 
in their bond, the landlord first should have filed an independent enforcement action against 
them on their bond as required by Utah statute and common law, and only thereafter, could 
the landlord have recorded lis pendens on Appellants1 homes. The purpose of requiring an 
independent action was amply demonstrated here: The sureties' personal liability on their 
bond did not exist until after the unlawful detainer action resulted in a judgment for damages 
for unlawful detainer against the commercial tenant, and also not until after the tenant 
refused to pay what was due to the landlord as a result of such unlawful detainer judgment. 
Thus, if the landlord had filed an independent action, Appellants-sureties here justifiably 
would have raised the defense of payment by the tenant, who was the principal obligor. In 
addition, the sureties would have had an opportunity to prevent the recording of the lis 
pendens (or to quickly have it removed), simply by paying their liability on their bond, and 
thereby preserving the integrity of the title to their homes. Since the landlord did not bring 
such independent action, Appellants-sureties were defenseless against the landlord's filing 
of the lis pendens on their homes, because by definition, Appellants-sureties were not parties 
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to the unlawful detainer action. The only remedy available to the sureties was this lawsuit 
for wrongful lien, as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LIS PENDENS RECORDED BY APPELLEES AGAINST 
APPELLANTS' HOMES WERE WRONGFUL LIENS BECAUSE THEY 
WERE NOT MEXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY ... STATE ... 
STATUTE" AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-l(6)(a)1 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) requires documents purporting to create "liens or 
encumbrances" on realty to be "expressly authorized by ... state ... statute" 
Appellants alleged in their complaint below that the lis pendens which Appellees 
recorded on Appellants' homes were "wrongful liens" because they were not "expressly 
authorized by ... state ... statute" as required under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a). Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) provides: 
"Wrongful Lienf means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state: or 
l
. The trial court dismissed all of Appellants' claims herein as a matter of law upon 
Appellee's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). The standard of review for all issues in this appeal therefore is the 
"correction of error" standard, for which no deference is due the trial court. Ong 
International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler 
v. Seiten 838 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §38-9-1(6) (1996Xemphasis added). r 
The plain language of statutes controls. Utah Dept. of Environmental Quality v. Wind 
River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Utah 1994). Thus, if a state statutory provision is 
alleged to justify a document purporting to create a lien or encumbrance in Utah, such 
statutory provision must do so expressly. Moreover, as discussed below, this strict 
requirement is justified by the serious detrimental effect of liens or encumbrances on realty. 
B. Lis pendens are documents purporting to create "liens or encumbrances" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) 
The phrase "lis pendens" literally means "pending suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
942-43 (7th ed. 1999). At common law, the mere filing of a lawsuit with respect to realty, 
such as a mortgage foreclosure or a quiet title action, imparted constructive notice that 
anyone who acquired an interest in the realty after the suit was filed would be bound by any 
judgment in that suit. Matter of Certain Notices of Pendency of Action and an Interlocutory 
Judgment and Order Recorded Against 2003 and 2007 Ala Wai Boulevard v. New York 
Diamond. Inc.. 85 Haw. 398, 408, 944 P.2d 1341, 1351 (Interm. Ct. App. 1997). The 
common law rule thus protected plaintiffs in such lawsuits in their ability to ultimately 
execute on judgments resulting from such litigation, but at the expense of subsequent 
purchasers and mortgagees of the land, who were bound merely by the filing of a complaint 
in a suit about which they were not likely to find out. 
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Lis pendens statutes, such as Utah Code Ann. § 70-40-2,2 ameliorate the harsh effects 
of the common law rule on subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. In form, a lis pendens is 
a document stating that there is a lawsuit pending affecting title to the land upon which the 
lis pendens is recorded. Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). The effect of a 
recorded lis pendens, however, remains the same as under the common law rule: it 
subordinates the interests of all persons who take title or liens with respect to the land 
subsequent to the date of the recordation of the lis pendens to the interests of those who 
acquire rights in the land as a result of the outcome of the pending lawsuit, and it 
accomplishes all this by imparting merely constructive notice of that subordination. Bagnall 
v. Suburbia Land Company, 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978). The significant difference from 
the common law is that a prospective purchaser or mortgagee is more likely to get actual 
notice of a document recorded in the real estate records than of a complaint filed in a court, 
as under the common law rule. 
The impact on the defendant-debtor, however, both under the common law rule and 
under the lis pendens statute, is awesome: Since no prospective purchaser or lender will "buy 
2
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 provides: 
"In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real 
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter.. .may 
file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property... is 
situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing a description of 
the property in that county affected thereby." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2 (1996)(emphasis added). 
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a pig in a poke" by acquiring an interest that will be subordinated to the rights arising from 
the undetermined outcome of the pending litigation, the practical effect of a recorded lis 
pendens is to render land unmarketable and unsuitable as security for a loan. Beefy King Intl 
v. Veigle, 464 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir.l972)(fTor all practical purposes, it would be 
virtually impossible to sell or mortgage the property because the interest of a purchaser or 
mortgagee would be subject to the eventual outcome of the lawsuit."). As recently 
summarized by the Hawaii courts: 
"[T]he practical effect of a recorded lis pendens is to render .. .property unmarketable 
and unsuitable as security for a loan. The financial pressure exerted on the property 
owner may be considerable, forcing him [or her] to settle not due to the merits of the 
suit but to rid himself [or herself] of the cloud upon his [or her] title. The potential for 
abuse is obvious. Id. (quoting La Paglia v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.App.3d 1322, 264 
Cal.Rptr. 63, 64 (1989) (citations omitted))." 
Matter of Certain Notices of Pendency of Action and an Interlocutory Judgment and Order 
Recorded Against 2003 and 2007 Ala Wai Boulevard v. New York Diamond, Inc., 85 Haw. 
398, 408, 944 P.2d 1341, 1351 (Interm. Ct. App. 1997) quoting S. Utsunomiva Enters, v. 
Moomuku Country Club, 75 Haw. 480, 866 P.2d 951 (1994)(emphasis added)(citations 
omitted). 
The effect of a recorded lis pendens, therefore, is to place an "encumbrance" upon the 
land against which it is recorded under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a). An "encumbrance" 
is "any right a third party holds in land which constitutes a burden or limitation upon the 
rights of the fee title holder." Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). A lis 
pendens most assuredly seeks to burden or limit the rights of the fee title holder of the land 
against which it is recorded by subordinating the interests of those who may acquire interests 
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in the land after the recordation of the lis pendens. "Indeed, there would be little point in 
filing the [lis pendens] if it did not result in encumbering the property." Cf. Russell v. 
Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244,1247 n.9, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 82, If 9 n.9 (2000)(recorded "Notice 
of Interest"). 
Similarly, the effect of a recorded lis pendens, also places a "lien" upon the land 
against which it is recorded under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a). A "lien" as a legal charge 
collectible out of specific property for the payment of a debt. Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 
443, 446, 235 P.2d 510, 511 (1951). A recorded lis pendens imposes a lien on the land upon 
which it is recorded in favor of those who acquire rights in the land as a result of the 
judgment in the pending litigation. The land, therefore, is subject to the "debt" of such 
judgment. 
C. Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2 does nottf expressly1 f authorize the lis pendens herein 
Since lis pendens are "liens or encumbrances" upon the lands against which they are 
recorded, they must be "expressly authorized by ... state ... statute" in order to avoid 
characterization and liability as "wrongful liens" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a). The 
word "expressly" means "directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely implied or left 
to inference." State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 665, 670, 127 S.W.2d 697, 699 
(1939). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2) provides that the Wrongful Lien Statute does not prevent 
a person from filing lis pendens "in accordance with § 78-40-2". UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-
2(2)(emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, however, requires that there must be an 
action pending "affecting the title to, or the right of possession of" the realty against which 
a lis pendens is recorded. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2 (emphasis added). Thus, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-2 does not "expressly" authorize a landlord to record a lis pendens against the 
land of a surety on a renter's counter bond as occurred here, when there as no action pending 
"affecting the title to, or the right of possession of," the surety's land. Since in this case there 
was such action pending "affecting title or possession" to the Appellants' homes at the time 
that Appellees recorded their lis pendens, such recordings were was not "in accordance with" 
§ 78-40-2 and therefore were "wrongful liens" under § 38-9-1(6) because they were not 
"expressly" authorized. 
The trial court erred by inferring such authority from the Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, 
since Utah Code § 38-9-1(6) in plain language and unambiguously requires that such 
authorization must be express. Utah Dept. of Environmental Quality v. Wind River 
Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Utah 1994)(plain language of statutes controls). 
Quite independently of the requirement in the Wrongful Lien Statute that 
authorization for lis pendens must be "express," principles of statutory construction and Utah 
precedents require strict construction of the necessary connection between the land upon 
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which a lis pendens is recorded and the type of lawsuit needed to justify such recordation 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. That section provides: 
"In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter...may file for 
record with the recorder of the county in which the property... is situated a 
notice of the pendency of the action, containing a description of the property 
in that county affected thereby." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2 (emphasis added). 
This section plainly and closely ties "the action" to "the property" upon which the lis 
pendens is recorded. Cases interpreting the section also have required a close connection 
between "the action" and "the property" upon which a lis pendens is filed. In the landmark 
case of Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), a California attorney 
filed a lis pendens on Mr. Winter's land in Utah in order to enforce a California divorce 
judgment. The Court of Appeals held that there was no action pending "affecting title or 
possession" to Mr. Winter's land in Utah because: 
"[The California divorce] complaint and decree failed to address title to or 
possession of the Utah real property as required under section 78-40-2 " 
Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d at 1223 (emphasis added). 
The Winters court added: "In determining the validity of a lis pendens, courts have generally 
restricted their review to the face of the complaint." Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d at 1223. 
Nowhere in the Unlawful Detainer complaint (R. 93-97) is there any mention of the homes 
of Appellants Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines, and the lis pendens therefore were invalid. 
Similarly, in Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996), a foreclosure suit 
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was begun by lenders to enforce their security interests in lands pledged for loans by the 
defendant-debtor. The lenders stated in their complaint that they were also conducting a 
separate, nonjudicial, trust deed sale on certain lands ("trust deed property"! which had also 
been pledged as security for the loan by the defendant-debtor. The defendant-debtor filed a 
"lispendens on the trust deed property...pending nonjudicial foreclosure of such property," 
pursuant to the defendant-debtor's proposed amended counterclaim which was erroneously 
rejected by the trial court. Timm, supra at 1386 n.4 The defendant-debtor's proposed 
amended counterclaim sought "reconveyance of the trust deed property." Timm, supra at 
1388 (emphasis added). As the court confirmed: 
"The proposed amended counterclaim seeks both damages and specific performance 
via reconveyance of the trust deed property." 
"... Mrs. Dewsnup's proposed amended counterclaim against the lenders involves a 
determination of whether the Dewsnups had paid all amounts due under the 
promissory notes. If the trial court finds on remand that they had paid the amounts 
owed on the promissory notes in full, then the lenders' foreclosure on the Dewsnups' 
property, including the trust deed property, would be in error. Thus, Mrs. Dewsnup's 
interest in the trust deed property is subject to the outcome of this case. We therefore 
hold that the trial court erred in releasing the lis pendens from the trust deed property. 
Timm, supra at 1393 (emphasis added)(order of paragraphs reversed for clarity). 
Accordingly, the "action" in Timm, (the rejected proposed amended counterclaim of the 
defendant-debtor), clearly and directly affected "title or possession" of the property subject 
to the lis pendens involved in the case. 
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In all other Utah cases as well, the Us pendens were premised on actions directly 
affecting title to the land on which the Us pendens had been imposed. Tuft v. Federal 
Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982)(action to foreclose mortgage; Us pendens recorded by 
foreclosing mortgagee on land subject to the mortgage); Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 932 
(Utah 1980)(motion by wife to set aside allegedly fraudulent divorce decree; Us pendens 
recorded by wife on three properties held in joint tenancy by the parties); Glynn v. Dubin, 
369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962)(action for separate maintenance and divorce; Us pendens recorded 
by wife on marital property held in joint tenancy by the parties). 
Moreover, Appellees through the filing of the Us pendens on Appellants1 homes were 
merely seeking a money judgment arising from the Unlawful Detainer Action, not title or 
possession of Appellants1 homes. "Utah law does not allow for the filing of a Us pendens in 
cases seeking a money judgment." See Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999) quoting Busch v. Doyle. 141 B.R. 432, 436 (Bankr.D.Utah 1992); see also 
Hamilton v.Smith. 808 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir.l986)(§ 78-40-2 prohibits filing of lis pendens 
in anticipation of money judgment). Thus, Appellees' recordation of the lis pendens herein 
was not authorized. 
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D. Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2, when read in conjunction with the Unlawful Detainer 
Statute, does not "expressly" or implicitly authorize the lis pendens herein 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 provides that lis pendens may be recorded in "any action 
affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property...." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
40-2 (1996). The only "action" pending on March 30, 1999, when Appellees recorded the 
lis pendens on Appellants' homes, was "Parkside Salt Lake Corporation v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 
Utah Third District Court Civil No. 98 090 6982," in which Appellee landlord Parkside sued 
a commercial tenant, Insure-Rite, Inc., for Unlawful Detainer with respect to office space 
located in downtown Salt Lake City. (R. 93-97) Appellants herein, Mr. G. Richard Kasteler 
and Ms. Mary L. Daines, two people who, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), 
were not parties to the Unlawful Detainer Action, executed a Renter's Counter Bond on 
behalf of the tenant Insure-Rite, Inc., whereby Appellants became sureties to the tenant with 
respect to payment of damages and costs in the event that the tenant were ultimately found 
in unlawful detainer and did not pay such damages and costs, and further pledged their 
homes as additional security for such payment. (R. 188-194) 
The trial court below decided that two clauses in the Unlawful Detainer Statute made 
the unlawful detainer proceeding an "action affecting title" to Appellee's homes for purposes 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2, the lis pendens statute: (1) Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), 
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providing that a Renter's bond "shall be payable to the clerk of the court,1'3 and (2) Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-10(4), providing that unlawful detainer judgments "may be issued and enforced 
immediately."4 (R. 278-279)5 
The trial court erred in such interpretation because even when combined with these 
provisions in the Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2 does not "expressly" 
authorize the lis pendens herein as demanded by Utah Code § 38-9-l(6)(a), the Wrongful 
3
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b) provides: 
"The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a counter bond 
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond 
executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the defendant's option. The bond 
shall be payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file the bond prior to 
the expiration of three days from the date he is served with notice of the filing of 
plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is 
the probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the 
plaintiff if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall 
consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b)(1996)(emphasis added). 
4
. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) provides: 
"If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent,, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the 
judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(4)(1996). 
5
. The trial court also relied on Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. 
Ct. 1987), for the proposition that Appellant-sureties' obligation on the Renter's bond 
could be enforced without bringing an independent enforcement action, and that such 
obligation could be enforced by motion in the Unlawful Detainer proceeding. (R. 279-
280, pp. 6-7) Fitzgerald, however, arose under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 64C, which 
expressly provides for enforcement by motion rather than independent action. No such 
provision is involved in this case. 
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Lien Statute. And even if express authorization were not required, such combination of 
statutory provisions also cannot reasonably be construed to authorize the lis pendens herein 
by implication. 
The provision that a Renter's bond "shall be payable to the clerk of the court" in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b) does not by any stretch of language provide that a landlord may 
record a lis pendens against bond sureties' realty without filing an independent enforcement 
action against the bond surety. On the contrary, the well-established common law rule in 
Utah is that a creditor on a bond cannot recover directly against the surety on the bond, nor 
against the surety's property, without bringing an independent action against the surety. 
Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah 71, 118 P.2d 130 (1941)(injunction bond); see also 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)(citing Junction case as general rule); Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977)(confirming that Junction case states rule in Utah). 
In every single instance in which the Legislature has deemed it appropriate, it has 
modified this common law rule expressly, and in no uncertain terms, providing for 
enforcement of certain types of bonds by motion, using the following language: 
"The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an 
independent action." 
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-35-704(bail bond)(emphasis added); 77-20-5 (bail 
bond)(emphasis added); 78-38-14 (crack-house abatement bond)(emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, using identical language, overturn the 
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common law rule expressly for other types of bonds. See Rule 7, Utah Rules App. Proc. 
(appeal bond); Rule 65A(c)(3), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. (injunction bond); Rule 64C(g), Utah 
Rules Civ. Proc. (writ of attachment bond); Rule 64B(e), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. (defendant's 
counter-bond in replevin action for personalty); Rule 62(i)(4), Utah Rules Civ. Proc. 
(supersedeas bond). 
In the absence of a court rule or statute containing that standard language to the 
contrary, the common law rule requiring an independent action on a bond prevails. See, e.g., 
Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah 1977)("[Rule 65A(c)(3) on injunction 
bonds] eliminates the necessity of an independent action by further providing that liability 
on the surety bond fmay be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent 
action on the bond."'). Accordingly, the trial court's construction of the terms "payable to 
clerk of the court" in the Unlawful Detainer Statute in conjunction with the lis pendens 
statute cannot stand.6 
6
. It is possible that sureties may attempt to alienate surety lands before landlords 
have an opportunity to file independent actions against the sureties to enforce their 
obligations on Renters Counter-Bonds. In fact, this was openly acknowledged by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996)(ff[I]n the 
event that Mrs. Dewsnup prevails on her amended counterclaim against the lenders, the 
possibility of reconveyance of the trust deed property depends on whether such property 
was sold to a bona fide purchaser or whether the property was sold to one who had actual 
or constructive notice of the pending litigation.") The Court, however, left it to the Utah 
Legislature to make other provisions. 
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Similarly, the trial court's construction of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4), providing 
that unlawful detainer judgments "may be issued and enforced immediately," in conjunction 
with the lis pendens statute to implicitly authorize the recordation of the lis pendens herein, 
cannot stand. Not only does such language fail to support the trial court's interpretation, but 
such a reading would undermine the policies which form the foundation of landlord-tenant 
lawinUtah. 
The Utah legislature has carefully balanced landlord and tenant rights. Thus: (1) On 
the tenant's side, a landlord can no longer use self-help to remove a tenant. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-36-12 (1996). (2) In exchange, however, landlords have been provided with a summary 
proceeding whereby through the posting of a Possession Bond, landlords can quickly recover 
possession of the premises. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5 (1996). (3) Tenants, however, 
can nevertheless post a Renter's Counter-Bond, "trumping" the landlord's possession bond, 
thereby allowing tenants to remain on the property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5 (1996). 
Utah appellate courts have carefully maintained this equilibrium by emphasizing that 
the landlord remedy of Unlawful Detainer is to be strictly construed: 
"The unlawful detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the 
common law. It provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that it 
must be strictly complied with before the cause of action may be maintained." 
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 1979)(notice to quit defective because did 
not notify tenant that it had the right to pay delinquent rent)(emphasis added); see also Cache 
County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(landlord's notice defective 
because contained no expression of "remedy or quit" as the statute requires, but merely noted 
that "no payments were made," and ordered tenant to surrender possession). 
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The trial court's decision, if allowed to stand, would overturn this careful balance by 
providing landlords with a powerful self-help remedy which the Legislature has withheld. 
POINT II 
THE LIS PENDENS RECORDED BY APPELLEES AGAINST 
APPELLANTS' HOMES ARE NOT PROTECTED BY THE 
"JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS" PRIVILEGE 
A. The Wrongful Lien Statute specifically supplants the judicial proceedings 
privilege with respect to the lis pendens herein 
The common law judicial proceedings privilege has been specifically supplanted in 
this setting by the statutory liability imposed by Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute.7 The Utah 
7
. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 provides: 
"(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against 
real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages 
proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct 
the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a record 
interest holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-
known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to the record interest 
holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
"(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real 
property, knowing or having reason to know the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-4 (1996)(emphasis added). 
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legislature thus has expressly provided that conduct which "purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance," such as the filing of a lis pendens which has not been expressly authorized 
by state statute, is a "wrongful lien" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). This Court should 
not extend the common law judicial proceedings privilege to circumstances the Legislature 
has determined create "wrongful liens." 
Moreover, as set out in Point I above, in this case the Wrongful Lien Statute must be 
read in conjunction with policies underlying landlord-tenant, lis pendens and surety law. At 
its foundation, Appellees' claim of the judicial proceedings privilege is an attempt to overturn 
the careful balance between landlords and tenants which the Utah Legislature has crafted. 
This Court should not give Appellee-landlord a self-help remedy the Legislature has denied. 
B. The judicial proceedings privilege does not apply here 
The purpose of the judicial proceedings privilege is to protect the truth-finding 
function of the adjudicatory process by shielding judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants and 
counsel from liability resulting from statements made during the course of a judicial 
-proceeding. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). 
:
" Thus, where there is no pending judicial proceeding that might be detrimentally 
affected if statements are not protected, the judicial proceedings privilege does not apply. For 
example, in Wright v. Lawson, 530 P.2d 823, 825-26 (Utah 1975), this court held that an 
allegedly defamatory letter which merely mentioned a pending federal proceeding before the 
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National Labor Relations Board, but otherwise was not preparatory to or in the course of 
litigation, was not privileged. 
Similarly, in this case there was no judicial proceeding that might be detrimentally 
affected if Appellees are held liable for recording the lis pendens on Appellants' homes. First, 
the Unlawful Detainer Proceeding against the commercial tenant had already concluded in 
a trial court ruling that the commercial tenant was liable for damages for unlawful detainer. 
Second, Appellees obviously had no intention of filing an independent enforcement action 
against Appellants on their bond, so there was no prospect of preparation for such a lawsuit. 
Imposition of liability on Appellees for the recordation of the lis pendens, therefore, would 
not interfere with the truth-finding process of any judicial proceeding, and thus is not 
prevented by the judicial proceedings privilege. 
Utah decisional law regarding the judicial proceedings privilege is not to the contrary. 
In Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), the court stated: 
"The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to give constructive 
notice of the pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is the action 
filed—it has no existence independent of it. ... The ... recordation of a notice 
of lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings. Since the 
publication of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof 
by recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged." 
Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). 
In Hansen, however, the lis pendens was supported by a pending action directly affecting 
title to the land subject to the lis pendens, so there would have been no liability under Utah 
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Code Ann. § 38-9-4 for a "wrongful lien" under the facts in the case. See Hansen, supra 
(action for declaration that deeds transferring "Howell property" were intended as security 
instruments; lis pendens recorded on "Howell property"). Thus, if the Appellees herein had 
filed an action against the Appellants-sureties on their bond first, and thereafter recorded the 
lis pendens involved, Appellants' lawsuit would not have resulted. 
More fundamentally, the Hansen decision overlooked the profound effect on title that 
lis pendens entail. In this case, the landlord recorded the lis pendens precisely because they 
did more than merely impart notice; the landlord used them as self-help weapons to force the 
tenant to move and to pay quickly. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS ALSO STATED CLAIMS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE, 
QUIET TITLE, AND INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
A. Standard for Statement of Claims for Purposes of 12(b)(6) Motions 
l;
 Under Utah RXiv.P. 8(a), "a pleader is required only to make a short and plain 
statement of his claim." Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 454 
(1955)(quoting Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (1953)). "[A] 
complaint is required only to " ... give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis 
or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Blackham 
v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d at 160, 280 P.2d at 455 (quoting 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal 
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Practice and Procedure § 255 at 431-34 (I960)). 
Plaintiffs' complaint amply meets this standard. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
declared on a number of occasions: 
"[w]hen [ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must] accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
"[A motion to dismiss should be granted only] where it appears to a certainty that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim . . . [and the court is] obliged to construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its 
favor." 
Arrow Industries. Inc. v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). 
"The courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about 
whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should 
be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." 
Baurv. Pacific Fin. Corp.. 14 Utah 2d 283, 284, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). See also Conlev 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)(A complaint may not 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."). 
In ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court therefore was prohibited 
from determining issues of fact«as well as from determining whether triable issues of fact 
existed, as it might when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Quite the contrary, the 
trial court was required simply to ascertain whether Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently 
demonstrates that Plaintiffs had stated claims for relief. 
When viewed through this lens, Appellants properly stated claims for relief, so 
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Appellees'motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
B. Wrongful Lien Claims 
Appellants properly alleged such claims for "wrongful liens" under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 38T9-1 et seq. Appellees' recordation of lis pendens on Appellants' homes were not 
authorized by statute or otherwise. (R. 4-7, fflf 12-22) 
C. Slander of Title Claims 
Appellants properly pled all elements, including the requirement of special damages, 
with respect to Appellants' claims for slander of title.8 First, as Bass v. Planned Management 
Services, Inc. 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988) states, Appellants may allege "actual or special 
damages." Bass, supra at 568; see also Gilimor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995)("actual_or special damages"). In the slander of title context, this means alleging 
"pecuniary loss." Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 Utah 106, 111, 208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 
• ~.^+: 1949)("a plaintiff in a suit for slander of title ... [must allege and prove] a pecuniary loss 
resulting from the act of the defendant.") Appellants allege in ^  26 of their complaint: "The 
conduct of Appellees ... in filing each of such lis pendens caused pecuniary loss to 
Appellants." That is all that Notice Pleading requires. (R. 7-8, ffif 23-28) 
8
. The elements for a slander of title claim are: (1) a publication, either oral or 
written, of a slanderous statement; (2) the statement must be false; (3) the statement must 
have been made with malice; and (4) the statement must cause actual or special damages 
to the plaintiff. Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc, 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 
1988). 
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Allegations required in a complaint should not be confused with proof at trial. Having 
properly alleged "pecuniary loss" resulting from the acts of Appellees, Appellants were free 
to prove such loss at trial through various means. "Attorney fees have been held to be 
recoverable as special damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on the 
title." Bass, supra at 569. Similarly, "evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some other 
pecuniary advantage ... affecting the saleability or use of the property" is sufficient proof at 
trial. Bass, supra at 568. Bass does not require allegations of such lost sales; the court was 
simply referring to different types of proof at trial. Appellants will present the proper proof 
at trial. 
D. Quiet Title Claims 
In order to state a claim for quiet title a party need only allege that legal title is in him 
and that the defendants have no right, title, or interest adverse to him in the premises in 
controversy; the plaintiff need not be in possession himself. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-40-1; 
Gibson v. McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 161, 106 P. 669, 672 (1910). Appellants' complaint 
contains these elements. (R. 9, ffl[ 29-32) 
Appellants1 quiet title claims are not mooted by the fact that, after Appellants filed 
their complaint, Appellees finally released the lis pendens on Appellants' homes. Since 
Appellees' position is that they can impose lis pendens on Appellants' homes even if there 
is no litigation pending on Appellants' renter's surety bond, there is nothing to prevent 
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Appellees from improperly re-filing their Us pendens. Moreover, the Unlawful Detainer 
action has not been fully concluded because it is currently on appeal. Accordingly, 
Appellants1 quiet title claims are not moot, since Appellees' conduct is "capable of repetition 
yet evading judicial review." State v. M.L.C.. 933 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1997). 
E* Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the following 
allegations: 
"[A]n action for severe emotional distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact 
or physical injury, [may lie] where the defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, 
(b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his 
actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they 
offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." 
Samms v. Eccles. 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961). 
Appellants' complaint contains these elements. (R. 9-10, fflf 33-37) 
F. Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the following 
allegations: (1) negligence; (2) emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm 
manifested by objective symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have 
suffered emotional distress under the circumstances of the case. Handy v. Union Pacific R. 
Co.. 841 P.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Thus, in such "direct harm" settings, the 
difference between intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress is the state of 
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mind of the defendant. Appellants included each of the necessary elements in their 
complaint. (R. 10-13, ffif 38-43) 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' complaint and 
Appellees should be taxed with costs on appeal. 
DATED this «££" day of September 2000. 
fOHN MAI 
Attorney for Appellants" 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Renter's Counter Bond (R. 188-194) 
Exhibit 2: Lis Pendens on Appellant Daines home (R. 196-199) 
Exhibit 3: Lis Pendens on Appellant Kasteler home (R. 201 -204) 
Exhibit 4: Appellees' letter refusing to remove lis pendens (R. 221) 
Exhibit 5: Appellants'Complaint below (R. 1-25) 
Exhibit 6: Trial court memorandum decision, Januaiy 19, 2000 (274-281) 
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 72 09) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP. 
a Utah, corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
) RENTER'S COUNTER BOND 
) Case No. 98 090 6982 
i Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
This property bond represents security posted with the Court 
by the Renter, Defendant, as the probable amount of costs of suit 
and actual damages that may result to the Owner (Plaintiff) if 
Plaintiff has improperly withheld possession of the premises 
located at: 215 SOUTH STATE STREET SUITE 401, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
84111-2354. 
PROPERTY BOND 
We the undersigned, G. Richard Kasteler, and Mary L. Daines, 
are residents of Salt Lake and Davis County, respectively, State 
of Utah, and we each own property in the property in the State of 
C:\WPDOCS\I\insurite v parkside.7.wpd 
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Utah. We jointly and severally undertake the obligation of this 
bond in the sum of $ 25,000.00, and we shall pay all costs and 
damages which may be awarded to the Owner, not exceeding the sum 
undertaken. We state that each of us has a net worth, above 
debts, more than the sum undertaken; and we pledge the property 
listed herein as security in the above entitled action. 
> 
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8TOETY NOtt 1 
RENTER'S COUNTER BOND 
Case No.: 98 09 06982 
1. Location of real property being pledged to execute this 
bond: 1210 East Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
2. Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the 
property: None 
3. Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with 
necessary appurtenant facilities; for legal description see 
attached exhibit "AA". 
4. Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of 
$100,900.00. 
5. Fair market value of property: $383,000.00 
6. Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is 
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the 
pledge for the within security. 
Mary^Xj. Daines 
1210 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Tele: 801.295-5072 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
The foregoing instrument was /ackncjrftledged before 
this 12th day of August, 1998, by Mary p.^Da^n^, the signer^ 
hereof. 
My Commission Expires: 
JIC, Res 
ce Count^^iit^tL — — — -* 
— — — — "~ Notary Public J 
NICK J. COLESSIDES I 
466 South 400 East | 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 , 
MY Commission Expires J 
February 23, 1999 I 
State of Utah ^ _ j 
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SURETY NO,; 2 
RENTERfS COUNTER BOND 
Case No.: 98 09 06982 
5, 
6, 
Location of real property being pledged to execute this 
bond: 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. 
Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the 
property: None 
Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with 
necessary appurtenant facilities, located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah; for legal description see attached exhibit 
"BB\ 
Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of 
$198,000.00 
Fair market value of property: $275,000.00 
Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is 
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the 
pledge for the within security. 
G. Richard Kasteler 
6278 South Granada Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Tele: 801.531-0731 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
^ The foregoing instrument was ackn 
this 12ch day of August, 1998, by G. R^ch^r 
hereof. i 
My Commission Expires: 
before me 
gner 
C:\WPDOCS\I\in5urite y parkside.7.wod 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Renter's Counter Bond 
to: 
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ 
MR GREGORY J SAVAGE ESQ 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, first 
class mail, this /j^day of August, 1998. 
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) 
frtm * A^ if 
Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a 
point South 89 deg. 49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 
min West 1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section 
29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in the 
City of Bountiful, and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West 
159.99 feet to the South line of the Northeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of said Section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 
min. West 103.37 feet; thence North 0 Deg. 08 min. East 171.83 
feet to said street at a point on a 325 foot radius curve to the 
left; thence along said curve for an arch distance of 86.98 feet 
along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the point of 
beginning 
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fawn "$3> tf 
Sid*e ) Ho.: 22-21-2 31-009 
Unit No. 8 in Slock B, of MONTE CRI5T0 PHASE 1, a Condominium 
Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed for record 
as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, together 
with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the "Common 
Area: and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase [, H , [[[, rind IV 
as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of 
Covenants* Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a 
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached 
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in 3P~L > 7 1 1 -* 
REC BY:V ASHBT ,DO>UTY - in 
cr 
f>o 
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When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, ] 
V . j 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) 
) LIS PENDENS 
l Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
#66871 
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Date Time M. 
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Nancy Workman, Recorder 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
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since awarded money damages in the amount of 5108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this Of day of March, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:s 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this $1- day of March, 1999, by 
Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & OwenLLLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
Notary Public "1 
DEBRA BOWMAN , 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 I 
Salt take City, Utah 84111 Notary rublic 
'JiL-V^mA 
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EXHIBIT A 
Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point 
South 89 deg. 49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West 
1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of Bountiful, 
and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West 159.99 feet to the 
South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said 
section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence 
North 0 deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325 
foot radius curve to the left; thence along said curve for an arch 
distance of 86.98 feet along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the 
point of beginning 
) 
) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this J/Uday of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mary L. Daines 
1210 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, ] 
V.
 J 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ) 
Defendant. ] 
) LIS PENDENS 
i Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the ' 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
tote Time
 mmmmmmmmmmmmm U. 
request of _ _ _ _ 
Nancy Workman, Recorder 
Sail Lake County, Utah 
3 By Deputy 
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since awarded money damages in the amount of $108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this £_ day of March, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
By_ 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was 
Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
acknowledged before me this ^ 7 . day of March, 1999, by 
* s^?r«>* Notary Public I 
I / ^ * £ £ ® \ OEBRA BOWMAN , 
' w Pfc^7^' * ? i *j 1 East 8 r o a d w a y . S u i t e 11 °° • 
r 
My 
Wt»ft '$ Saitlake City. Utah M111 . 
'ft Mv Conynission Expires | 
) 
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EXHIBIT A 
Sidwell No.: 22-21-231-009 
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a 
Condominium Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, 
together with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the 
"Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and 
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a 
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached 
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at pages 
173 through 178 of Official Records. Said Common Areas and 
Facilities being set forth and defined by the original Declaration filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144 through 
182 of Official Records, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth 
Amendments thereto. 
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I CFRTTFTCATF OF SFRVTCF. 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this jffiday of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
G. Richard Kasteler 
6278 South Granada Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
I 
#66874 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
August 20,1999 
IreggoryJ. Savage 
aixigeg@/iro. com 
Forneys at Law 
\1 East Broadway-
iite 1100 
lit Lake City, Utah 
1111-5233 
>l (801)521-5800 
ix (801) 521-9639 
ww.hro.com 
lit Lake City 
enver 
oulder 
olorado Springs 
ondon 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., Case No. 980906982 
Dear Mr. Colessides: 
I am in receipt of your letter of August 17, 1999, demanding removal of the lis 
pendens filed on certain properties owned by Richard Kasteler and Mary L. 
Daines. As you know, on or about August 13,1998, Mr. Kasteler and Ms. 
Daines pledged the subject properties as security for the bond posted by Insure-
Rite, Inc. in the above-referenced matter. Neither Mr. Kasteler nor Ms. Daines 
have ever requested that the Court release their respective property and the Court 
has never entered an order providing for the release of the properties. The above-
referenced matter remains pending. A judgment has been entered against Insure-
Rite, which judgment has not been fully satisfied. As such, Parkside continues to 
be entitled to look to Insure-Rite's bond, and more specifically the properties 
pledged as security for the bond, to satisfy the judgment against Insure-Rite. 
Under these circumstances, we believe the continuation of the lis pendens filed 
against the properties is proper and we will not agree to remove them. If you 
disagree with this position, please let me know and we will address this matter to 
the Court. 
Sincerely, 
^^A 
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Third Judicial District 
AUG 1 8 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
"y 
Cccujy Cierk 
NICK J . COLESSIDES (USBA # 6 9 6 ) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521-4441 
Fax: 801.521-4452 
JOHN MARTINEZ (USBA #4523) 
Attorney at Law 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Tele: 801.582-1386 
Fax: 801.582-7664 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
G. RICHARD KASTELER and : 
MARY L. DAINES, : 
: COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, : 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
v. : 
GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW : 
N. EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS : 
&. OWEN, a Utah Limited : 
Liability Partnership, : 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE : 
CORPORATION, a Delaware : 
corporation : Case No.: 99 09 ffipgffig"" 
Defendants. : Judge: lOJ^Uk^/ 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kast v holme lit.l.wpd 
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Plaintiffs hereby allege as follows: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-34-4(1) because this is a civil matter not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
2. Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-1 because Plaintiffs claim recovery for injuries to 
real property located within the jurisdiction of this Court; and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7, because all causes of action 
arise, or all Defendants reside or have their principal offices or 
places of business, in Salt Lake County. 
3. Plaintiff G. Richard Kasteler owns and resides at a 
residence located at 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121. 
4. Plaintiff Mary L. Daines owns and resides at a residence 
located at 1210 East Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
5. Defendant Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP, is a Utah Limited. 
Liability Partnership doing business as a law firm in Salt Lake 
County. Such law firm represented Parkside Salt Lake Corporation in 
the case of "Parkside Salt Lake Corporation v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 
Utah Third District Court Civil No. 98 090 6982," an action for 
unlawful detainer with respect to certain business premises located 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kast v holme lit.l.vpd 
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at 215 South State Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-
2354, (hereinafter "Parkside unlawful detainer action"). 
6. Defendant Parkside Salt Lake Corporation is a Delaware 
corporation doing business in Salt Lake City. Such defendant was 
the Plaintiff in the Parkside unlawful detainer action. 
7. Defendant Greggory J. Savage ("Savage") is an attorney 
practicing in the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP, in Salt 
Lake County. Savage was an attorney of record for Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation in the Parkside unlawful detainer action. 
8. Defendant Matthew N. Evans ("Evans") is an attorney 
practicing in the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP, in Salt 
Lake County. Evans was an attorney of record for Parkside Salt Lake 
Corporation in the Parkside unlawful detainer action. 
9. On or about March 30, 1999, Savage and Evans, in their 
capacities as attorneys at Defendant Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP, 
and on behalf of such law firm in its representation of Defendant 
Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, filed for recordation in the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office a Lis Pendens on the home of 
Plaintiff G. Richard Kasteler, and which created a lien or 
encumbrance on Plaintiff's ownership interest in such home at the 
time it was recorded or filed. A copy of such Lis Pendens is 
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attached hereto as Exhibit *B and incorporated herein by reference. 
10. On or about March 30, 1999, Defendants Savage and Evans, 
in their capacities as attorneys at Defendant Holme, Roberts & 
Owen, LLP, and on behalf of such law firm in its representation of 
Defendant Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, filed a Lis Pendens on 
the home of Plaintiff Mary L. Daines, and which purported to create 
a lien or encumbrance on Plaintiff's ownership interest in such 
home at the time it was recorded or filed. A copy of such Lis 
Pendens is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
11. At the time of the filing for recordation of both of such 
Lis Pendens, no complaint had been filed, and there was no action 
pending, affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, 
Plaintiffs' homes, which were the subject of such Lis Pendens. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
WRONGFUL LIEN 
12. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 11 of this complaint. 
13. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants against 
Plaintiffs' homes were wrongful liens because at the time such Lis 
Pendens were recorded or filed, such Lis Pendens were not expressly 
authorized by Title 38, Chapter 9 of the Utah Code. 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kast v holme lit.l.wpd 
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14. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants against 
Plaintiffs1 homes were wrongful liens because at the time they were 
recorded or filed, such Lis Pendens were not expressly authorized 
by any other state or federal statute. 
15. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants against 
Plaintiffs1 homes were wrongful liens because at the time they were 
recorded or filed, they were not authorized by or contained in an 
order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the State 
of Utah. 
16. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants against 
Plaintiffs' homes were wrongful liens because at the time such Lis 
Pendens were recorded or filed, they were not signed by or 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by Plaintiffs, the owners 
of the real properties subject to the two Lis Pendens. 
17. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation; Holme Roberts 
Sc Owen, LLP; and Defendants Greggory J. Savage and Matthew N. Evans 
knew or had reason to know that the two Lis Pendens were wrongful 
liens. 
18. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants against 
Plaintiffs' homes were groundless because at the time of the filing 
of such Lis Pendens, no complaint had been filed, and there was no 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kast v holme lit.l.wpd 
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action pending, affecting the title to, or the right of possession 
of Plaintiffs' homes, which were the subjects of the two Lis 
Pendens. 
19. Defendants Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP, Savage, Evans knew 
or had reason to know that the two Lis Pendens were groundless. 
20. In both of such Lis Pendens, Defendants Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP; Savage, and Evans 
stated: "You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-
entitled action concerning title to certain real property situated 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit A attached hereto." The properties referred 
to were the homes of Plaintiffs herein. The action referred to, 
"Parkside Salt Lake Corporation v. Insure-Rite, Inc., Utah Third 
District Court Civil No. 980906982," was not an action affecting 
title to Plaintiffs' homes, but was instead an action for unlawful 
detainer with respect to business premises located at 215 South 
State Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2354. 
Accordingly, such statement by Defendants was a material 
misstatement or false claim. 
21. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts 
& Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans knew or had reason to know that the 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kaat v holme lit.l.wpd 
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two Lis Pendens contained a material misstatement or false claim 
because Defendants Savage and Evans, working for Defendant Holme 
Roberts & Owen, LLP, were representing Defendant Parkside Salt Lake 
Corporation in such referenced action, and such defendants knew or 
had reason to know that such action was an unlawful detainer action 
with respect to business premises located at 215 South State 
Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2354, and not an 
"action affecting title to or the right to possession of" 
Plaintiffs' homes. 
22. WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the Defendants as hereinafter set 
forth. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
23. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 22 of this complaint. 
24. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts 
& Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans, filed each of the subject Lis 
Pendens against Plaintiffs1 homes without privilege to do so and 
maliciously because such defendants knew or should have known that 
there was in fact no action pending affecting title to, or the 
right to possession of, Plaintiffs' homes. Defendants Holme Roberts 
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Sc Owen, LLP, Savage and Evans have been in the business of law 
practice for sufficient time to know that there was in fact no 
action pending affecting title to, or the right to possession of, 
Plaintiffs' homes, and that an unlawful detainer action with 
respect to another parcel of real estate was not such an action. 
25. The two Lis Pendens filed by Defendants Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans were 
untrue and disparaging of Plaintiffs' ownership interests in their 
homes because such Lis Pendens falsely published that an action was 
pending affecting title to or the right to possession of 
Plaintiffs' homes. 
26. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts 
Sc Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans filed both of such Lis Pendens under 
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable person to foresee 
that the conduct of third parties as purchasers or lessees of 
Plaintiffs' homes might be determined. 
27. The conduct of the above named Defendants in filing each 
of such Lis Pendens caused pecuniary loss to Plaintiffs. 
28. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the Defendants as hereinafter set 
forth. 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kasC v holme lit.l.wpd 
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
QUIET TITLE 
29. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 28 of this complaint. 
30. The conduct by Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans in filing each of the 
subject Lis Pendens has established a cloud on the titles to 
Plaintiffs' homes. 
31. Such cloud on the titles to Plaintiffs' homes was 
wrongfully imposed, since at the time of the filing of each of such 
Lis Pendens, there was no action pending affecting title to or the 
right to possession of, such properties. 
32. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the Defendants as hereinafter set 
forth. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
33. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 32 of this complaint. 
34. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts 
&. Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans intentionally filed for recordation 
each of such Lis Pendens even though such defendants knew that 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kast v holme lit.l.wpd 
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there was no action affecting title or the right to possession of 
Plaintiffs' homes. 
35. The Defendants, jointly and severally, engaged in such 
conduct in circumstances in which any reasonable person would have 
known that such conduct would result in causing Plaintiffs 
emotional distress resulting from such Defendants1 conduct. 
36. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer severe 
emotional distress as a direct result of Defendants' conduct. 
37. WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the Defendants as hereinafter set 
forth. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
38. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 37 of this complaint. 
39. Defendants Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, Holme Roberts 
8c Owen, LLP, Savage, and Evans filed for recordation each of such 
Lis Pendens when such Defendants reasonably should have known that 
there was no action pending affecting title to or the right to 
possession of Plaintiffs' homes. 
40. Such conduct by the Defendants in circumstances in which 
any reasonable person would have known that such conduct would 
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result in causing Plaintiffs emotional distress resulting from such 
Defendants' conduct. 
41. Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer severe 
emotional distress as a direct result of Defendants' conduct. 
42. Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial upon all issues so 
triable, and hereby tenders the required filing fee to the Clerk of 
the Court. 
43. WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, 
jointly and severally, against the Defendants as hereinafter set 
forth. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, against 
Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
a) For an order declaring each of the subject Lis Pendens a 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing Plaintiffs' homes and 
properties from such liens, and quieting title in Plaintiffs to 
their homes; 
b) For the sum of $6,000 and/or for treble actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(3); and 
c) For Plaintiffs' compensatory damages, plus interest to date 
D:\WPDOCS\K\kaat v holme lit.l.wpd 
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of payment, in a sum of not less than fifty thousand Dollars 
($50,000.00), or such other greater or lesser sum as the Court may 
find; 
d) For punitive damages, plus interest to date of payment, in 
a sum of not less than five million dollars ($5,000,000.00), or 
such other greater or lesser sum as the Court may find; 
e) For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney's fees, plus interest to 
date of payment, in the sum of seventy five thousand dollars 
($75,000.00), or such other greater or lesser sum as the Court may 
find reasonable and proper; and 
f) For such other and further relief as the court deems just 
and proper. , j 
DATED this f*» day of August, 19 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
G. RICHARD KASTELER 
% INSURE RITE INC 
23 0 SOUTH 500 EAST SUITE 58 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
MARY L DAINES 
1210 EAST MILLBROOK WAY 
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010 
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When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN I.I.I> 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) LIS PENDENS 
) Civil No. 980906982 
) Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
ujis _ Tlma _ i i 
licqcesl of 
Nancy Workman. Recorder " " " 
Salt Lake County. Utah 
w 5 y
 • . Oeputy 
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since awarded money damages in the amount of S108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this £±_ day of March, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
•fi> 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ^ 7 'day of March, 1999, by 
Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
I ($@£$§\ 0EBRA BOWMAN 
I 
M y < 
mm 
Notary Public ~ J 
I 
SaftUkeCiry. Utah 64111 
Mv Com/rwssion Expires | 
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EXUIB1XA 
Sidwel! No.: 22-21-231-009 
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a 
Condominium Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, 
together with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the 
"Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and 
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a 
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached 
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at pages 
173 through 178 of Official Records. Said Common Areas and 
Facilities being set forth and defined by the original Declaration filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144 through 
182 of Official Records, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth 
Amendments thereto. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SFRVICF 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this j^> day of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
G. Richard Kasteler 
6278 South Granada Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
tr* 
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Lr.try #. 
When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans. #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v.
 t 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) LIS PENDENS 
) Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterposscssion property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
Date Time M. 
iicques; of 
foar.uy Workman. Recorder 
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since awarded money damages in the amount of SI 08,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this ^ f 'dav of March, 1999. 
•i 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /71 day of March, 1999, by 
Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & OwenxLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
lifda 
Notary Public ~"& 
,A DEBHA BOWMAN . 
\A 111 East Broadway. Suite MOO I 
I Sa» Lake Dry. (Jtan84in 
Co rVirrri^^^f ni rei 
Notary rublic 
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Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point 
South 89 deg. 49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West 
1160.01 feet from the East Quaner corner of Section 29, Township 2 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of Bountiful, 
and running thence South 0 deg. OS min. West 159.99 feet to the 
South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said 
section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence 
North 0 deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325 
foot radius curve to the left; thence along said curve for an arch " 
distance of 86.98 feet along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the 
point of beginning 
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I cenify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this 'yOday of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325 
• John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Man' L. Daines 
1210 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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PLAINTIFF/PEUTIONER 
Name fZ\tHPrf-p Cr £AS7CC£<£ 
Address 1>tui<. ^£° 
Day Time Telephone 
PIJyD^^^IFF/PETI^^o^nER 
Name 
Address 
ATTY FOR Pl^INTlFF/PETnTONER 
Name 
Address mmummmmim 
SALT LAO CT1TUEAH Mill-* 
Day Time Telephone gC{ ^ t ^ ^ 
ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETinONER 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone 
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name 
Address 
Day Time Telephone 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name QtitCrtcoAf 5#v+c-£ e* a ( 
Address Hi €MT 3,Zt$?m~t 
Day Time Telephone 
Day Time Telephone 
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
Name • S 
Address C 
Day Time Telephone f J 
TOTAL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
$ 
JURY DEMAND 
X Y e s • No 
SCHEDULE OF FEES: §21-1-5. CHECK ANY THAT APPLY. (SEE CASE TYPES FOR 
FILING FEES FOR COMPLAINTS OTHER THAN CLAIM FOR DAMAGES) 
a 
a 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
Civil, Interpleader or Small 
Claims: $2000 or less 
Small Claims: $2001-55000 
Civil or Interpleader: $2001 -
$9999 
—— 
$37 
$60 
$80 
• 
X 
a 
a 
Civil or Interpleader: $10,000 
and over 
Civil Unspecified 
Rjcrcnn T ANirnTiC — 
———— IVllaCllXXAiMVwUo — 
Jury Demand 
Vital Statistics §26-2-25 
$120 
$120 
$50 
$2 
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ee Case Type 
APPEALS 
Fee 
$120 
drqpistrative Agency Review 
'"** Claims Trial de Novo 
120 Q 
^^2XU»t^SSmAL CIVIL 
120 t3 "Attorney Discipline 
Sch • Civil Rights 
120 O Condemnation 
Sch O Contract 
Sch • Debt Collection 
$50 • Expungement (Fee is $0 under 
circumstances of §77-18-10(2)) 
Sch • Forcible Entry and Detainer 
120 Q Forfeiture of Property 
Sch • Interpleader 
Sch Q Lien/Mortgage Foreclosure 
Sch • Malpractice 
Sch 2^L Miscellaneous Civil 
120 • Extraordinary Relief 
Sch • Personal Injury 
120 • Post Conviction Relief: Capital 
120 • Post Conviction Relief: Non-
capital 
Sch Q Property Damage 
Sch % Property/Quiet Title 
Sch Q Sexual Harassment 
Sch • Small Claims 
Sch a Tax 
Jch a Water Rights 
Sch • Wrongful Death 
Jch Q Wrongful Termination 
DOMESTIC 
$0 • Cohabitant Abuse 
20 Q Common Law Marriage 
.20 Q Custody/Visitation/Suppoit 
!80 • Divorce/Annulment 
• Check if child support, custody or 
visitation will be part of decree 
20 Q Paternity 
8^0 • Separate Maintenance 
20 Q Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 
Case Type 
Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFSA) 
-JUDGMENTS 
$25 Q Abstract of Foreign Judgment or 
Decree 
$40 O Abstract of Judgment or Order of 
Utah Court or Agency 
$30 Q Abstract of Judgment or Order of 
Utah State Tax Commission 
$25 • Judgment by Confession 
$0 • Renew Judgment 
PROBATE 
$120 a Adoption 
$120 • Conservatorship 
$120 Q Estate Personal Rep - Formal 
$120 Q Estate Personal Rep - Informal 
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$120 • Involuntary Commitment 
$120 Q Minor's Settlement 
$120 Q Name Change 
$120 O Supervised Administration 
$120 • Trusts 
$120 • Unspecified Probate 
SPECIAL MATTERS 
$0 • Administrative Search Warrant 
$25 Q Arbitration Award 
$0 • Criminal Investigation Search 
Warrant 
$0 • Deposit of Will 
$0 Q Determination of Competency in 
Criminal Case 
$0 • Extradition 
$25 Q Foreign Probate or Child 
Custody Document 
$0 Q Hospital Lien 
$25 • Judicial Approval of Document 
not part of a Pending Case 
$25 • Notice of deposition in out-of-
state case 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE IT4^DIP#^!|9ICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
G. RICHARD KASTELER and MARY L. 
DAINES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW N. 
EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, a 
Utah Limited Partnership, 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
Deputy Clerk 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990908395 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
January 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to this motion on November 29, 1999. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having now considered the motions, memoranda, 
exhibits attached thereto and for the good cause that has been 
shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
This case centers around the procedures a landlord must use to 
enforce a tenant's property counter-bond against the tenant's 
surety. Specifically, on July 17, 1998, defendant Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation ("Parkside"), filed an unlawful detainer action 
against Insure-Rite, Inc. ("Insure-Rite"), alleging that Insure-
Rite had unlawfully failed to vacate certain business premises 
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KASTELER v. SAVAGE Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
owned by Parkside, which are located at 215 South State Street. On 
August 13, 1998, the court in the unlawful detainer action entered 
an order requiring Insure-Rite to post a counter-possession bond in 
the form of a property bond, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-
8.5(2) (b), as security for the costs and actual damages that 
Parkside would be entitled to recover if it prevailed in the 
unlawful detainer action. On that same day, G. Richard Kasteler 
("Kasteler") and Mary L. Daines ("Dairies")-the plaintiffs in the 
present action-complied with the court's order in the unlawful 
detainer action by posting a Renter's Counter-Bond on behalf of 
Insure-Rite with the court in the unlawful detainer action. This 
bond pledged Kasteler's and Daines' homes as security. 
On November 30, 1998, the court in the unlawful detainer 
action granted partial summary judgment in favor of Parkside on its 
principal claim and entered an Order of Restitution directing 
Insure-Rite to promptly vacate the premises it had leased from 
Parkside. On March 15, 1999, the court in the unlawful detainer 
action entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Parkside on the issue of damages and ordering Insure-Rite to pay 
Parkside a damage award of $108,417.24 plus interest, attorney's 
fees, and costs. 
On March 30, 1999, Greggory J. Savage ("Savage") and Matthew 
N. Evans ("Evans"), of Holme Roberts & Owen, in their capacity as 
n n 9 7 ^  
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KASTELER v. SAVAGE Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
counsel for Parkside, filed for recordation in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office two lis pendens bearing the caption of the 
unlawful detainer action. 
Ultimately, the judgment was satisfied by other means. On 
September 1, 1999, Savage and Evans, on behalf of Parkside, filed 
documents with the Salt Lake County Recorder releasing the Lis 
Pendens on Kasteler's and Daines' houses. 
On August 18, 1999, Kasteler and Daines filed this action 
asserting claims for relief against all defendants for wrongful 
lien, slander of title, quiet title, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
ANALYSIS 
In support of their motion, defendants argue plaintiffs' 
complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because the lis 
pendens out of which all of plaintiffs' claims arise are both 
permitted by Utah's lis pendens statute and are absolutely 
privileged. Additionally, it is defendant's position each 
individual claim in plaintiffs' complaint suffers from specific 
defects that cause it to fail as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing Utah law expressly 
provides that the landlord must bring an independent action on the 
renter's counter-bond. Furthermore, assert plaintiffs, since 
defendants did not properly file the lis pendens, such filings are 
n A o ^ o 
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not protected by the judicial proceedings privilege. With respect 
to the claims individually, plaintiffs contend they have 
sufficiently pled all of the necessary elements to support their 
causes of action. 
"A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in 
the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based 
on those facts." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) quoting 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 
227 (1981). When ruling on a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are considered in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. quoting Colman v. Utah 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2: 
,.,-„.„ In any action affecting the title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the object of the action 
or defense, and a description of the property 
in that county affected thereby. From the time 
of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have 
nn?77 
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constructive notice of the pendency of the 
action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
Plaintiff contends that since the prior action did not affect title 
to the houses posted as bond, the aforementioned required an 
independent action be filed. However, after reviewing the 
applicable statutory and case law, such does not appear to be the 
case. 
As an initial matter, the possession-bond statute provides the 
court in an unlawful detainer action jurisdiction by requiring that 
"[t]he bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2) (b) (1996). Accordingly, rather than merely 
requiring sureties to submit personally to the jurisdiction of the 
court for enforcement purposes, the possession-bond statute ensures 
that the court will have jurisdiction to enforce a bond by 
essentially requiring the sureties to surrender to the court any 
money or property pledged as security. Indeed, if this were not 
the case, it would be impossible for the court to order "immediate" 
execution o.ri an unlawful detainer judgment-a procedure that the 
unlawful detainer statutes expressly require. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-36-10(4) (1996)-1 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) provides: 
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer 
after default in the payment of the rent, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued 
0097« 
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Furthermore, the property bond that Kasteler and Daines posted 
in the unlawful detainer action satisfied the requirements of the 
possession-bond statute and the bond could have been enforced 
against them in that very action. Indeed, the bond which Kasteler 
and Daines signed designated their houses as "security posted with 
the Court" in the unlawful detainer action. It also contained the 
caption of the unlawful detainer action and was filed in the 
unlawful detainer action. Essentially, Kasteler and Daines 
surrendered their houses to the court in the unlawful detainer 
action as security for their undertaking to "pay all costs and 
damages which may be awarded to the Owner" in the unlawful detainer 
action up to the amount of $25,000. By this voluntary appearance 
and the pledging of their houses as security in the unlawful 
detainer action, Kasteler and Daines submitted themselves and their 
houses to the jurisdiction of the court, which could enforce the 
bond. Accordingly, no independent enforcement action was 
necessary. 
This position is further supported by the case of Fitzgerald 
v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. Ct. 1987), where it was 
questioned whether the surety had submitted itself to the 
immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and 
enforced immediately. 
n n o 7 Q 
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jurisdiction of the court for purposes of enforcing the bond. In 
Fitzgerald, the Court of Appeals concluded that although the bond 
did not contain the precise language submitting the surety to the 
jurisdiction of the court, the bond would nevertheless "be enforced 
according to the terms of the authorizing rule." id. at 305. 
Furthermore, the court stated that as an alternative basis, the 
surety had made a general appearance at the show cause hearing, 
thereby submitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce 
payment on its undertaking. Id. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court concludes defendants were 
not required to bring an independent action on the renter's 
counter-bond. Further, since all parties agreed a finding by this 
Court that the lis pendens was proper under Utah's lis pendens 
results in the failure of plaintiffs' claims against defendants, 
the Court does not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims 
individually. Defendants' Motion to dismiss is well taken and 
accordingly, granted. 
DATED this If day of January, 2000 
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Case No. 990908395 
Ce r t i f i c a t e of Mailing 
I ce r t i fy tha t on the 20th day of January, 2000, I sent by 
f i r s t c lass mail a t rue and correct copy of the at tached document 
to the following:' 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
JAMES T. BLANCH 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800 
P.O. BOX 45898 
SLC, UTAH 84145-0898 
NICK J. COLESSIDES 
466 SOUTH 400 EAST, SUITE 100 
SLC, UTAH 84111-3325 
JOHN MARTINEZ 
2974 EAST ST MARY'S CIRCLE 
SLC, UTAH 84108 
D i s t r i c t Court Clerk 
By: ^ C X N A 
eputy Clerk 
••Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this 
proceeding should call 238-7300, at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
TDD phone for hearing impaired, 238-7391. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed the original of the foregoing and nine copies with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111-1860 
and served two copies of the foregoing upon the following: 
Gordon L. Roberts 
James T. Blanch 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0898 
via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this pl3day of September 2000, addressed as set forth 
above. 
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